Topics explored in this series include the history and practice of international law (including sources of international law, Indigenous treaties, international treaty diplomacy, subnational treaty making, domestic reception of international law and Parliament's role in international law), as well as Canada's role in international law, governance and innovation in the broad fields of international economic, environmental and intellectual property law. Topics with an economic law focus include international trade, dispute settlement, international taxation and private international law. Environmental law topics include the international climate change regime and international treaties on chemicals and waste, transboundary water governance and the law of the sea. Intellectual property law topics explore the development of international IP protection and the integration of IP law into the body of international trade law. Finally, the series presents Canadian perspectives on developments in international human rights and humanitarian law, including judicial implementation of these obligations, international labour law, business and human rights, international criminal law, war crimes, and international legal issues related to child soldiers. This series allows a reflection on Canada's role in the community of nations and its potential to advance the progressive development of global rule of law. 
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The International Law Research Program (ILRP) at CIGI is an integrated multidisciplinary research program that provides leading academics, government and private sector legal experts, as well as students from Canada and abroad, with the opportunity to contribute to advancements in international law.
The ILRP strives to be the world's leading international law research program, with recognized impact on how international law is brought to bear on significant global issues. The program's mission is to connect knowledge, policy and practice to build the international law framework -the globalized rule of law -to support international governance of the future. Its founding belief is that better international governance, including a strengthened international law framework, can improve the lives of people everywhere, increase prosperity, ensure global sustainability, address inequality, safeguard human rights and promote a more secure world.
The ILRP focuses on the areas of international law that are most important to global innovation, prosperity and sustainability: international economic law, international intellectual property law and international environmental law. In its research, the ILRP is attentive to the emerging interactions among international and transnational law, Indigenous law and constitutional law.
About the Author
Suzanne Lalonde is a professor of international law and the law of the sea at the University of However, while identifying order and stability as the core tenets of international law, Shaw emphasizes that "to survive, it must be in harmony with the realities of the age." 2 He adds, "there is a continuing tension between those rules already established and the constantly evolving forces that seek changes within the system. One of the major problems of international law is to determine when and how to incorporate new standards of behaviour and new realities of life into the already existing framework, so that, on the one hand the law remains relevant and on the other, the system itself is not too vigorously disrupted.... There are several instances of how modern developments demand a constant reappraisal of the structure of international law and its rules." 3 Canada, throughout its 150-year history, has adhered to and, at times, has had to vigorously defend the ideal of the rule of law among nations. This vision and commitment were recently emphasized by Canada's Minister of Foreign Affairs Chrystia Freeland in an address to the House of Commons, identifying Canada's foreign policy priorities: "Since before the end of the Second World War, beginning with the international conference at Bretton Woods in 1944, Canada has been deeply engaged in, and greatly enjoyed the benefits of, a global order based on rules."
In her remarks, however, she also alluded to a number of key developments and issues that provoked a necessary evolution in the established legal system, declaring that "[i]n each of these evolutions in how we humans organize ourselves, Canadians played pivotal roles." 5 Thus, Canada, while being a staunch defender of international law as a guarantor of shared aspirations and values, has not been immune to the tension identified by Shaw. Indeed, Canada has inevitably been confronted with the reality that international law must adapt and respond to fundamental shifts in priorities and the rise of new powerful forces. Yet, as its essential function is to provide order and stability, international law can struggle to adapt quickly to sudden changes. Dennis Livingston refers to international law's "traditional image as a social process relatively slow to respond to contemporary public issues."
6 At certain critical junctures, international law has needed a major event or a resolute sponsor to evolve.
On at least two occasions, Canada has played the role of determined promoter of necessary change in the law of the sea. Stepping outside its usual role of committed proponent of the established international legal order, Canada has chosen to act beyond the strict confines of existing rules to defend environmental values and promote a more effective governance regime. powers of the pollution prevention officers charged with the effective enforcement of the act.
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At the time of its adoption, the AWPPA was denounced by a number of countries, most notably the United States, 17 as contrary to international law, which did not, at that point, recognize coastalstate rights in waters beyond the territorial sea.
18
Indeed, the Canadian government effectively admitted that the AWPPA was unlawful when, shortly before adopting the statute, it entered a reservation to its acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) that excluded litigation over the matter. 19 In explaining the need for the reservation, on April 8, 1970, Trudeau acknowledged that there was a "very grave risk that the World Court would find itself obliged to find that coastal states cannot take steps to prevent pollution. Such a legalistic decision would set back immeasurably the development of law in this critical area." Articles 1 and 2 of the CTS confirmed that the sovereignty of a coastal state extended beyond its land territory and its internal waters to a belt of sea adjacent to its coast, described as the territorial sea, including in the air space above it, as well as to its bed and subsoil. While the participating delegations were unable to agree on a precise external limit to the territorial sea, the definition of the contiguous zone in article 24 effectively limited claims to 12 nm. In the exercise of its sovereignty, the coastal state was entitled to devise and impose laws and regulations for the protection of its territorial waters, and article 14 provided that the right of innocent passage could be exercised only so long as it was not prejudicial to the peace, good order and security of the coastal state and, thus, in conformity with such laws and regulations.
The CTS also provided that in a specific zone of the high seas contiguous to the territorial sea, which could not extend beyond 12 nm from the 21 According to Veronica Frank, "it is commonly agreed that the term 'marine environment' refers to the ocean space taken as a whole (i.e., the surface of the sea; the water column; the subsoil; the seabed and the atmosphere above them) and everything comprised in that space, territorial sea baseline, the coastal state could exercise the control necessary to prevent and punish infringement of four specific categories of regulations, which included "sanitary regulations."
26
However, beyond this narrow band of sovereign waters (territorial sea) and zone of control (contiguous zone) -beyond, therefore, 12 nmthe law of the sea considered the maritime space as high seas, subject to a regime of freedoms. Despite the proximity of those high seas areas to their coastlines, coastal states were not granted any special environmental protection powers for fear of arbitrary infringements on the sacrosanct freedoms of navigation and fishing recognized in article 2 of the CHS. Articles 24 and 25 of the same convention merely imposed upon all states the obligation to draw up regulations to prevent pollution from ships or activities under their sovereign control, taking into consideration existing international standards.
While article 6 of the CFCLR, at least, acknowledged that "[a] coastal State has a special interest in the maintenance of the productivity of the living resources in any areas of the high seas adjacent to its territorial sea," 27 the conservation regime laid out in the convention was based on negotiations and consultations between all interested states. Article 1(2) of the convention aptly summarizes the approach under the CFCLR: "All States have a duty to adopt, or to cooperate with other States in adopting, such measures for their respective nationals as may be necessary for the conservation of the living resources of the high seas." The United Nations convened the Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea in 1958. Little attention was given to the protection of the marine environment at the Conference, and the conventions that the Conference delivered had little to say on the subject.... [W]hile reference was clearly made to the regulation of pollution, the 1958 conventions did not impose duties on States to adhere to that convention or regulate pollution at sea but merely empowered them to do so. Article 24 of the 1958 Convention on the High Seas, while requiring States to regulate oil pollution from ships, did not specify the content of those regulations beyond requiring that existing treaty provisions should be taken into account. This left a large measure of discretion available to those individual States. 29 Thus, in 1970, the success of environmental measures for the protection of vast sections of the oceans, the high seas, hinged on the political will of flag states and their actual capacity to exercise effective control over ships under their jurisdiction. And even when those two vital elements were present, environmental standards for ocean activities, at that time, were woefully out of step with new realities and emerging concerns.
Howard S. Schiffman characterizes the increasing concern for the status of the marine environment in the latter half of the twentieth century as one of "the most remarkable developments in the field of international law."
30 It might, therefore, be argued that while Canada's 1970 AWPPA was clearly contrary to the established rules, it contributed to a momentous shift in the law of sea as concern for the health of the world's oceans gained momentum. Only two years later, the "conceptual cornerstone of modern environmental law" 31 was laid with the convening of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (UNCHE), which had as one of its key priorities the protection of the marine environment. The Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment, 32 adopted by the UNCHE, contained principles that referred to the need to avoid damage to natural ecosystems and pollution of the seas by substances that could endanger human health, harm living resources and interfere with legitimate uses of the sea. As Lynton Keith Caldwell writes, "The Stockholm Conference was a (LOSC), which includes strong declarations on the protection of the marine environment. Indeed, according to the preamble, the basic objective of the convention is to establish a "[l]egal order for the seas and oceans which will facilitate international communication, and will promote the peaceful uses of the seas and oceans, the equitable and efficient utilization of their resources, the conservation of their living resources, and the study, protection and preservation of the marine environment."
35
Roberts explains that many of the outcomes of the UNCHE were placed before the UNCLOS III, ensuring "that it would focus on environmental issues and, as a consequence, the LOSC would stand as one of the most important international agreements on the subject of marine environmental protection." 36 Indeed, J. I. Charney argues that the LOSC established the very foundation of the international environmental law of the sea. 37 Without analyzing in detail all of the LOSC's environmental provisions, this discussion must highlight article 56(1)(b)(iii). Within a new maritime zone stretching a maximum of 200 nm from the territorial sea baselines -the EEZ created by part V of the LOSC -coastal states are now afforded jurisdiction with regard to "the protection and preservation of the marine environment."
38 In addition, articles 216 and 220 confer important enforcement powers upon coastal states for violations of pollution standards and rules by vessels navigating in their EEZs. More generally, part XII of the convention establishes an overall framework of governing principles and general obligations for the protection and governance of the world's oceans. Indeed, the LOSC is the first general international treaty to impose, through article 192, a general and unqualified obligation on states "to protect and preserve the marine environment."
39 In addition, as emphasized by Roberts, the LOSC alters the "balance of power between flag States and coastal States, with respect to the rights of the latter to regulate shipping for the purposes of protecting their coastal waters and the resources therein." 40 However, perhaps the clearest vindication of Canada's vision and its AWPPA is article 234 of the LOSC, often referred to as the "Arctic exception" or the "Canadian clause." According to this lone article in section 8 of part XII:
Coastal States have the right to adopt and enforce non-discriminatory laws and regulations for the prevention, reduction and control of marine pollution from vessels in ice-covered areas within the limits of the exclusive economic zone, where particularly severe climatic conditions and the presence of ice covering such areas for most of the year create obstructions or exceptional hazards to navigation, and pollution of the marine environment could cause major harm to or irreversible disturbance of the ecological balance. Such laws and regulations shall have due regard to navigation and the protection and preservation of the marine environment based on the best available scientific evidence.
41
As McRae comments, "In the space of six years, Canada went from the assertion of a claim to jurisdiction in domestic legislation that was protested by other states, and whose international validity was sufficiently in doubt for Canada to withdraw its acceptance of the jurisdiction of the ICJ, to international recognition of the acceptability of that legislation."
42
In addition to this formal international recognition of Canada's right to adopt and enforce the AWPPA, the Canadian rules themselves eventually came to exert considerable influence and are today considered a model for marine pollution legislation. 43 Franklyn Griffiths reported in 2009 that the AWPPA regulations were normalized when the member societies of the International Association of Classification Societies completed their ratification of a new set of uniform requirements in 2008 for polar ship construction, equipment, operations and environmental protection: "Canadian regulations for ship safety and pollution prevention in ice-covered waters that we regard as internal to Canada have become pretty well synonymous with the 'generally accepted regulations, procedures and practices' governing the duties of ships. 
The 1995 Canada-EU Turbot Dispute
The second example of Canada's influence on the development of the law of the sea is more controversial than the adoption of the AWPPA in 1970. For while the AWPPA undoubtedly served Canada's national interests and stretched the boundaries of what constituted, at the time, lawful conduct by a coastal state, the legislation and its detailed regulations were aimed at all ships navigating in Canadian Arctic waters, both domestic and foreign. Furthermore, the intent was not to deny or infringe established rights of navigation, but, rather, to ensure that navigation activities were conducted safely and responsibly.
Canadian measures and actions in the mid-1990s in respect of fishing activities by EU-flagged vessels do not appear quite as even handed. They have, in fact, been harshly criticized by some commentators in light of Canada's own disastrous mismanagement of its Atlantic fisheries. Indeed, as George A. Rose and Sherrylynn Rowe explain, "the great 'northern' Atlantic cod...stock complex off Newfoundland and Labrador...once among the largest cod stocks in the world, is often held up as the icon for decline and mismanagement."
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Those stocks once supported several million tons of fish but, after heavy unsustainable fishing in the 1960s and then again in the 1980s, the stock eventually collapsed to 1 percent of its previous level, and in 1992, the Canadian federal government was obliged to impose a moratorium.
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The crux of the fisheries dispute that arose between Canada and the European Union a few years later is expertly summarized in the opening sentence of Michael Sean Sullivan's 1997 article: "In March 1995, Canadian fisheries authorities boarded and arrested the Spanish fishing vessel, Estai, outside the Canadian 200-mile zone on the Grand Banks, an event that served to focus world attention on a dispute that had its origin in the failure of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea to implement an effective conservation and Making A Comeback", online: <www.iflscience.com/plants-and-animals/ cod-stocks-canadas-eastern-coast-making-come-back/>. management regime for fish stocks on the high seas, particularly with respect to fish stocks that straddle coastal states' exclusive economic zones." 48 It is generally accepted that even before the end of the third UNCLOS and the adoption of the LOSC in December 1982, the concept of the EEZ had already become part of customary international law as a result of its swift and widespread acceptance by a significant number of states. 49 Indeed, by 1977, most of the coastal states of the Northwest Atlantic, as in other areas of the world, had established either a 200-nm EEZ or an exclusive fishing zone (EFZ). In a bid to establish a more systematic and effective approach to the management of its valuable fisheries, Canada had, in 1970, created a series of EFZs, including off its Atlantic coast, which were eventually replaced by the Canadian 200-nm EEZ, effective January 1, 1977.
Within the new 200-nm EEZ, coastal states were not only afforded jurisdiction for the protection of the marine environment, as discussed above, but they were also granted sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources, whether living or non-living. Beyond the 200-nm EEZ, on the high seas, all states continued to enjoy the right for their nationals to engage in fishing activities. Fish stocks that straddled the two zones (that extended across the two zones or were situated in both zones) thus presented a significant challenge, namely that of reconciling the rights of nations to fish on the high seas with the rights of coastal states to manage fishery resources within their EEZs. 24, 1978, and the creation of the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO). According to article II of the NAFO Convention, the primary objective of the convention is "to ensure the long term conservation and sustainable use of the fisheries resources in the Convention Area and, in so doing, to safeguard the marine ecosystems in which these resources are found." 52 To reach this objective, the contracting parties agreed, individually or collectively, to "promote the optimum utilization and long-term sustainability of fishery resources" and to "adopt measures based on the best scientific advice available to ensure that fishery resources are maintained at or restored to levels capable of producing maximum sustainable yield." . 54 However, in recognition of the coastal states' jurisdiction up to 200 nm, management by NAFO is restricted to the areas straddling and outside the EEZs. This is known as NAFO's Regulatory Area (NRA) and is 2,707,895 km 2 . Song reports that approximately 10 percent of the Grand Banks (known as the "nose" and "tail" of the banks) lie beyond Canada's 200-mile EEZ and are included in the NRA. There are presently 12 contracting parties to the NAFO Convention: Canada, Cuba, Denmark (in respect of the Faroe Islands and Greenland), the European Union, France (in respect of St. Pierre et Miquelon), Iceland, Japan, Norway, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation, Ukraine and the United States.
In January 1982, the Canadian federal government set up a task force to identify problems in its rapidly expanding Atlantic fishing industry and to create a plan to manage it. While the task force, in its final report, made a number of strong recommendations to overcome existing impediments to effective management and conservation, the new strategy and strengthened political commitment were unable to prevent the drastic decline in Canada's Atlantic fisheries. [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] . 62 As Canada intensified conservation measures within its own EEZ, it also pressed for more effective management efforts within the NRA, that is to say, in those areas beyond Canadian control and thus managed by the NAFO. W. T. Abel writes that, at Canada's urging, the NAFO Scientific Council agreed to set a total allowable catch (TAC) for 1995 for Greenland halibut of 27,000 tons down from 60,000.
63 According to Abel, "Because NAFO considers both a member's historical dependence on fishing the NRA and its most recent quota level in setting a quota allocation, the European Union expected to obtain a substantial percentage of NAFO's Greenland halibut allocation. Previously, the EU had received seventyfive percent of NAFO's Greenland halibut quota. The Fisheries Commission, however, awarded the EU only about twelve percent or 3,400 tons of the total allowable catch, while providing Canada with nearly sixty percent, or 16,300 tons."
64
Dismayed by the quota allocation, the European Union invoked article XII (the objection procedure) of the NAFO Convention and unilaterally set its own quota for Greenland halibut, while maintaining the ceiling of 27,000 tons (it claimed 69 percent of the TAC, or 18,630 tons, for 1995). This marked a return to a strategy frequently relied upon by the European Union in the second half of the 1980s. Indeed, J. Alan Beesley and M. Rowe have established that, between 1986 and 1989, the European Union relied on the objection mechanism 36 times, including against all eight NAFO groundfish quota decisions and the NAFO Division 3L cod moratorium outside Canada's 200-mile EEZ. 65 The authors also show that in 1990, the European Union objected to eight NAFO decisions, while eight decisions in 1991 and three in 1992 were targeted by similar objections. Many of those objections then led to the setting of unilateral EU quotas. Song highlights a 1986 example in which NAFO had set the EU quota for cod in NAFO Division 3NO (off the coast of Newfoundland) at 14,750 tons, but the European Union objected and established a unilateral quota of 26,400 tons, and its catch was eventually estimated at 30,470 tons.
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In response to the European Union's objection and unilateral action in regard to the 1995 TAC, Canada declared a 60-day moratorium on Greenland halibut for EU vessels in the NRA. When EUflagged vessels disobeyed the moratorium, on March 3, 1995, Canada added Spain and Portugal to the list of nations it had banned from fishing on the high seas Grand Banks. As Abel explains, Canada viewed Spain and Portugal "as major offenders of international fishing agreements."
He cites arguments by Bob Applebaum, 68 who points out that while Spain had traditionally fished the Northwest Atlantic, it did not join the NAFO upon its formation: "Instead, Spain heavily fished the area outside the NAFO conservation framework, targeting cod, and fishing at a level higher than that set aside for Spain by NAFO." Furthermore, once Spain joined NAFO, it began to fish stocks above levels set by NAFO. According to Applebaum, "When Spain and Portugal joined the European Community, the European Commission adopted a noticeably more conservative position at NAFO meetings, which Canada blamed on Spain and Portugal's membership." 69 Song describes how tensions quickly escalated in the days following the extended Canadian ban: "On March 5, 1995, Canada issued a radio message, warning that EU vessels had fished enough and could be seized by Canadian authorities. On March 7, Canada's Minister of Fisheries and Oceans Brian Tobin warned the EU fishing vessels to withdraw from the 'nose' and 'tail' of the Grand Banks by March 8 or risk having their vessels seized." 70 On March 9, 1995, after warning shots were fired, and acting under the Coastal Fisheries Protection Act, Canadian officials boarded and seized the Spanish fishing trawler, Estai, eventually towing it back to the port of St. John's in Newfoundland. 71 Ted L. McDorman reports that "the arrest and confrontational approach [were] extremely popular in Canada" and that "[t]he righteousness of Canada's action was enhanced when it was asserted and theatrically demonstrated that the Estai had used undersized nets, had a false hold, had systematically misreported its harvesting activity and that the turbot on board were immature and of small size." 72 Canada's actions prompted retaliatory measures by Spain and the European Union, including the dispatch of Spanish naval patrol vessels to the waters off the coast of Newfoundland to ensure the safety of Spanish fishing vessels and to deter further Canadian interference. On March 28, 1995, the Spanish government also filed proceedings against Canada before the ICJ. However, despite significant tensions, both internationally and domestically, and what Song describes as "some diplomatic posturing and manoeuvring,"
73 Canada and the European Union were able to resolve their dispute on April 16, 1995. Abel notes, While the agreement does not address Canada's extension of its coastal state jurisdiction into the Grand Banks high seas, it reaffirms the parties' "commitment to enhanced co-operation in the conservation and rational management of fish stocks" and requires Canada to repeal its March 3, 1995 act prohibiting Spain and Portugal from fishing the Grand Banks. The agreement upholds the 27,000 ton Greenland halibut allocation and ensures a ratio of ten to three in favour of the EU and Canada for future Greenland halibut quotas. It also focuses primarily upon improved control and enforcement of NAFO fisheries through inspections, elaborating major infringements and vessel observers for the NRA. At NAFO's annual meeting in September 1995, members adopted the Canada and EU Agreement as a NAFO regulation, effective January 1, 1996.
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As noted above, in the discussion of Canada's 1970s AWPPA, the decision to specifically exclude from the ICJ's jurisdiction any disputes stemming from the Coastal Fisheries Protection Act one day before the amendments were adopted seems to confirm that the Canadian government was acutely aware that the proposed amendments were likely contrary to the existing legal framework. Yet Canada was determined to act to remedy what it perceived as a dangerous gap in the legal rules governing the sound management of fish stocks straddling coastal states' EEZs and the high seas.
Canada asserted that, as a coastal state, it possessed a special interest in preserving fish stocks straddling its EEZ. Certainly, no one could doubt that the quantity of fish taken on the nose and tail of the Grand Banks affected the quantity of fish within Canada's EEZ. It can be argued that this special interest and vulnerability with respect to stocks located both within its EEZ and in the high seas areas adjacent to it is in fact acknowledged by the 1982 LOSC. Article 63(2) provides as follows: "Where the same stock or stocks of associated species occur both within the exclusive economic zone and in an area beyond and adjacent to the zone, the coastal State and the States fishing for such stocks in the adjacent area shall seek, either directly or through appropriate subregional or regional organizations, to agree upon the measures necessary for the conservation of these stocks in the adjacent area." 75 However, article 63 seeks to establish a balance between the sovereign rights conferred upon coastal states by article 56(1)(a) to explore, exploit, conserve and manage the living resources within their EEZs and the freedom of fishing on the high seas, proclaimed under article 87 of the convention. This attempt to reconcile the competing interests of coastal states and distant fishing nations is also present in the high seas provisions that flesh out the "freedom of fishing." Article 116, which proclaims that "[a]ll States have the right for their nationals to engage in fishing on the high seas," 76 subjects this freedom to an obligation to respect existing treaty obligations, "the rights and duties as well as the interests of coastal States," 77 provided in articles 63(2) and 64 to 67, as well as the other provisions in section II of part VII (High Seas) of the convention. Article 118, for example, provides that states "shall" cooperate with each other in the conservation and management of living resources in the areas of the high seas. They "shall, as appropriate, co-operate to establish subregional or regional fisheries organizations to this end." 78 Both articles 63(2) and 118 specifically direct that regional organizations govern straddling stock issues. Abel comments that, "[b]y appointing regional organizations to manage ocean resources, UNCLOS III shifts authority away from coastal states to a more neutral policy maker. As members of the regional organizations, coastal states and distant water nations can work together in conserving the resources utilized by each."
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Abel concludes his 1996 article by arguing that while under the LOSC, coastal states may lose their "preferential rights," the "strengthening of regional organizations will provide for the conservation and management of straddling stocks in the most equitable manner, thus preserving the sea's resources for future generations."
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Sullivan is also of the opinion that the 1982 convention was clearly intended to bring to a halt "the pattern of unilateral extensions of jurisdiction and sovereignty into the seas that had preceded it."
81 Sullivan notes, "while the 1982 Convention sanctioned the expansion of coastal state jurisdiction to 200 miles, the treaty was also an expression of international desire to furnish a 'comprehensive framework with respect to uses of the oceans.... After decades of dispute and negotiation, the Convention reflects consensus on the extent of jurisdiction that States may exercise off their coasts and allocates rights and duties among States. '" 82 While the analysis of the various arguments justifying or condemning Canada's unilateral assertion of jurisdiction beyond its EEZ in respect of straddling fish stocks is a fascinating exercise for any student of international law, the focus of this enquiry is on the impact Canadian actions had on the subsequent development of the law of the sea.
One important consequence of Canada's resolve to tackle what it considered to be irresponsible fishing practices in the Northwest Atlantic was to significantly strengthen NAFO.
78 Ibid, art 118.
For while Abel argues that strong and effective regional fisheries organizations are the best arbiters of competing interests, Song opines that the 1995 Canada-EU dispute revealed "the failure of international and regional fisheries organizations in conserving fisheries resources and managing fisheries activities."
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As noted above, the April 1995 Canada-EU agreement that diffused the turbot crisis was eventually adopted as a NAFO regulation and became effective on January 1, 1996. The agreement targeted standard inspection procedures and increased the presence of inspectors in a bid to improve compliance with NAFO regulations. 84 Under the agreement/NAFO regulation, when inspectors suspect illegal activity, they must not unduly hinder fishing vessels, but should instead swiftly contact the flag state and NAFO's executive secretary. In addition, under NAFO regulations, the fishing stocks of members' vessels must undergo dockside inspection at each port of call, and the vessels must report catches of Greenland halibut to NAFO within 48 hours.
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Michael Keiver summarizes other important developments: "The Agreement included new measures to ensure compliance with NAFO measures: such as observers required aboard all fishing vessels (100 percent coverage), a satellite tracking system (35 percent coverage), dockside inspections of all vessels at each port of call, special powers to order a vessel to port for inspection, and authority to seal fish holds in order to preserve evidence." 86 Canada's forceful assertion of its special interest in protecting the Greenland halibut resulted in an agreement that significantly enhanced NAFO's enforcement capability and thus the overall effectiveness of the organization "to ensure the long term conservation and sustainable use of the fisheries resources in the Convention Area." 
Conclusion
Motivated by concerns over the potential pollution of its fragile Arctic waters and the depletion of vulnerable living resources off its Atlantic coast, Canada twice made the calculated decision to step outside the confines of the then-existing legal framework and to take concrete action in defence of those vital priorities. This brief analysis of the adoption of the Canadian AWPPA in 1970 and Canada's seizure of the Spanish fishing trawler in March 1995 should not, however, be misinterpreted as advocating unilateral action in the name of selfish national interests.
In both cases, it might be argued that Canadian actions merely anticipated developments in the law that were already being discussed in international fora and were gaining momentum. Such a modest assessment of Canada's role in the development of the law of the sea in regards to pollution control and fisheries management would certainly be a much more comfortable proposition for an international legal scholar. For as Shaw emphasizes, order is necessary for a just and stable existence, and international legal norms and rules provide that stabilizing framework.
And yet, as noted at the very beginning of this study, for the international legal order to remain relevant and effective, its structure and standards must at times be challenged and reappraised. Especially in the context of the 1970 AWPPA, it can be argued that Canada acted as a necessary agent of much-needed change, as a promoter of new, emerging priorities and values. In the 1990s, Canada's determination not only to participate in, but also to enforce vital conservation strategies for declining fish stocks, while undoubtedly risky, politically costly, controversial and very likely illegal, did force the issue out of sterile meeting rooms and onto the front pages of newspapers around the world, provoking discussion, debate and, ultimately, compromise.
As Foreign Affairs Minister Freeland emphasized in her June House of Commons address, 101 throughout its history, Canada has been a faithful and enthusiastic participant in the creation of a global order based on rules. However, at certain key moments and with respect to emerging global priorities, Canada has shown resolve and provided leadership in promoting new standards of behaviour to better serve the international community's interests in healthy and productive seascapes. CIGI Press books are distributed by McGill-Queen's University Press (mqup.ca) and can be found in better bookstores and through online book retailers.
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